Rev. Danny Fisher

Recently, in one of my “Burma News” posts, I included a critical piece from The Economist, which made the case that economic development might be a faster path to democracy in military-controlled Burma than anything Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the imprisoned Nobel Peace laureate and Prime Minister-elect, is doing. I didn’t agree, but I like to try to present different opinions in these posts. Well, it turns out that the editors of The Irrawaddy didn’t agree either, and they’ve produced a powerful statement to that effect:

The first point that needs to be made is that Suu Kyi does not dictate the Burma policy of Western countries. Although the issue of sanctions is often linked to her fate, that does not mean she is the main impetus behind the policy. When US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recently said that the US might be ready to invest in Burma if Suu Kyi was released, she did so at her own discretion, not in consultation with the detained democracy leader. Conversely, if Suu Kyi suddenly reversed her position on sanctions, there is no reason to believe that Western governments would automatically follow suit. To imply that she is somehow responsible for decisions made in foreign capitals is, therefore, grossly unfair.

It is also a distortion of the facts to suggest that sanctions are the cause of Burma’s endemic poverty. A total absence of accountable governance—not a lack of international aid or investment—is the real reason this resource-rich nation can barely support its own population. The junta has never had any difficulty in finding foreign partners willing to help it exploit Burma’s natural wealth. But most of the plunder from this wholesale theft of the country’s riches is deposited in overseas bank accounts or in bunkers in Naypyidaw; virtually none of it is plowed back into the local economy for the benefit of the country’s long-term development.

It is true, as The Economist notes, that official aid to Burma falls far short of what the country needs. Again, this is because most international donors don’t trust the regime to use aid appropriately or cooperate fully with the agencies that dispense it, not because they feel obliged to support the country’s pro-democracy leader. Even if Suu Kyi were completely removed from the equation—as some junta apologists and exasperated pseudo-pragmatists have long argued she should be—it would not alter the fact that, even post-Nargis, the regime does more to obstruct aid than facilitate it.

The fact that the regime has tightened the screws on the opposition at the very moment that the world wants to increase its aid to Burma shows that the generals are only interested in using the suffering of ordinary Burmese to their own advantage. In effect, they are telling the international community to make a choice: save Suu Kyi, or save the rest of the country. Suu Kyi herself would not hesitate to recommend the latter, if it were a meaningful choice. But it is not, because eliminating her as a political force would bring no tangible benefit to anyone but the generals.

The Economist is probably not, like some, hell bent on discrediting Suu Kyi. But it does subscribe to certain views that make it susceptible to the arguments of those who are. One of its most cherished ideas is that economic development is a force for political good. And so it asks if “the courageous Lady” will admit that “[d]evelopment … could be the fastest path to democracy.”

Never mind that the experiences of China and Vietnam, two countries mentioned as possible models for Burma, do not support this claim at all.

Read the whole thing here.

A few weeks back, I posted about the trouble brewing at Vietnam’s Bat Nha Monastery, where several members of Thich Nhat Hanh’s Order of Interbeing have been staying. The monastery itself is not affiliated with Nhat Hanh’s movement, but rather the official Buddhist Church of Vietnam. Following Nhat Hanh’s return to his homeland in 2005, the abbot at Bat Nha invited Order of Interbeing members to study and teach at the temple. The Order spent upwards of $1 million on new land and buildings at the monastery so that they might have appropriate space to do their work and not interfere with the other trainings taking place at Bat Nha. Then, following some statements from Nhat Hanh to the press, things became tense. Over at MahaSangha News, the wonderful Molly De Shong points us to an Associated Press story which indicates that things have now turned violent at the temple:

First, local authorities cut off their power, water and telephones.

Then, a mob descended on their compound with sledgehammers, smashing windows, damaging buildings and threatening occupants.

Communist authorities have ordered the 379 Vietnamese monks to leave the monastery in Vietnam’s Central Highlands. They say the standoff stems from disagreements between two Buddhist factions at the monastery.

But Hanh’s followers believe they are being punished because of Hanh’s praise for the Dalai Lama and his call to broaden religious freedom in Vietnam.

[...]

But the harmony began to unravel last year, Hanh’s followers say. Chinese officials were upset about published comments he made in support of the Dalai Lama and pressured Vietnam to bar the Zen master from addressing an international Buddhist gathering in Hanoi, they say.

In an interview with Italian TV, Hanh had said that Vietnam should allow the Dalai Lama to attend the Hanoi gathering and China should allow the Dalai Lama to return to Tibet to meet with his followers there, just as Hanh was allowed to return to Vietnam.

“I’m sure he knew that speaking out would bring him problems,” said Sister Dang Nghiem, a close Hanh associate who spent six months at Bat Nha.

And soon enough, problems began.

You can read the rest of the story here. And be sure to visit the website Help Bat Nha Monastery.

The BBC ponders the choices facing Than Shwe and the other generals in Burma’s ruling military junta as they delay sentencing Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, Nobel Peace laureate and Prime Minister-elect.

And as long as they can rely on China and Russia to veto any major action by the UN Security Council, and their neighbours at the Asean regional forum to do little more than voice occasional disapproval, the generals probably feel there will be no serious ramifications to keeping Aung San Suu Kyi behind bars.

Which is ultimately why most analysts believe that Ms Suu Kyi will be found guilty; the negatives of having her free outweigh the positives.

But even if he does send her to jail, Than Shwe already knows that she is likely to remain his most potent opponent.

She may be out of sight, but someone as iconic as Aung San Suu Kyi will never be out of Burmese minds.